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Abstract
Over the past 600 years, commodity frontiers – processes and sites of the incorporation of resources into
the expanding capitalist world economy – have absorbed ever more land, ever more labour and ever more
natural assets. In this paper, we claim that studying the global history of capitalism through the lens of
commodity frontiers and using commodity regimes as an analytical framework is crucial to understanding
the origins and nature of capitalism, and thus the modern world. We argue that commodity frontiers iden-
tify capitalism as a process rooted in a profound restructuring of the countryside and nature. They connect
processes of extraction and exchange with degradation, adaptation and resistance in rural peripheries. To
account for the enormous variety of actors and places involved in this history is a critical challenge in the
social sciences, and one to which global history can contribute crucial insights.
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The history of the making of the modern world is a history of the expansion of commodity fron-
tiers, a historical process so spatially, socially and structurally all-encompassing that it still awaits
its persuasive analysis. Over the past 600 years, since the inception of the capitalist revolution,
these commodity frontiers – processes and sites of the incorporation of resources (land, energy,
raw materials, knowledge and labour) – have moved at ever-accelerating speed across vast areas of
the globe, incorporating ever more land, labour and natural resources. Flatlands, valleys, forests,
marine spaces and mountains have been farmed, logged, fished and quarried to provide raw mate-
rials and food for a rapidly urbanizing and industrializing global economy, extractive processes
that have been crucial drivers of capitalism’s expansion.
Consider a product as common and banal as sugar. In Europe, it began its commodity life as a
luxury product available in small quantities to the very richest – the Parisian aristocracy or
Venetian merchants. By the fifteenth century, sugar production grew. As European power
expanded into the Atlantic, Italian and Iberian capitalists turned the Canary Islands, Madeira
and São Tomé into vast sugar estates, drawing on dispossessed land and enslaved labour to
set in motion a machinery of accumulation. A century later, Flemish and Dutch capitalists moved
this slavery-sugar complex to Brazil and then the Caribbean, turning one island after another into
†The authors would like to thank Pepijn Brandon, Philip McMichael and Marcel van der Linden for their valuable
comments.
© The Author(s), 2021. Published by Cambridge University Press. This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative
Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0), which permits non-commer-
cial re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the same Creative Commons licence is used to distribute the re-used or
adapted article and the original article is properly cited. The written permission of Cambridge University Press must be obtained prior to any
commercial use.
Journal of Global History (2021), 1–16
doi:10.1017/S1740022820000455
https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1740022820000455
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 81.83.181.57, on 11 Jun 2021 at 06:34:10, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
sugar-producing slave-labour camps. When mid-seventeenth-century British traveller Richard
Ligon looked at one such island, Barbados, he was awed by the ‘vast Revenue this little spot
of ground can produce.’1 So much wealth had been accumulated, yet, as he noted, it had been
accumulated ‘without the help of Magic or Enchantment.’2
It was not magic that turned dense forests into cane producing plantations at awe-inspiring
speed, but enslaved workers and capital-rich merchants and planters. After Barbados, the sugar
frontier moved to Jamaica, Saint-Domingue and Louisiana, with Cuba, by the nineteenth century,
the most productive sugar island in the world, the one that married the most modern technologies,
steam engines, to the most violent system of labour mobilization, slavery. At the same time, Dutch
colonial administrators began turning Java into yet another major sugar producer, just after
Chinese capitalists had transformed their newly acquired island of Taiwan into a significant source
of sugar for its domestic markets. Then, in the nineteenth century, as the Caribbean sugar frontier
faced the emancipation of its workers, new virgin sugar territories such as Mauritius, Guyana,
Réunion and Fiji arose, worked by indentured Indian and Chinese labourers producing for global
markets. Later that century, beet sugar began being produced on yet another commodity frontier
in the temperate zones of Europe and North America, one that used new systems of peasant
labour. And the movement continues: huge sugar frontiers are being created in western Brazil,
powered by transnational corporations, including giant German and French beet sugar producers,
marked by a high degree of vertical integration and deep entanglements with finance capital. More
than just a source of calories, the vastly increased sugar supply is now being used to make ethanol,
produced and sold as ‘green’ or ‘sustainable’ bio fuel.
Soy, another important contemporary commodity frontier and source of plant-based fuels, has
a shorter but no less volatile history. In the past 60 years, global soy production has increased by a
stunning 1000%. By 2018/19, the world produced 360 million tons of soy on more than 125 mil-
lion hectares of land, or more than three times the surface area of the Netherlands.3 Of ancient
Chinese origins, soy exploded across the globe in the twentieth century, led by state-sponsored
agricultural policies and North Atlantic-based transnational agribusiness firms, mainly in the
USA, which produced the majority of the world’s soy into the 1990s. Since then, businesses have
pushed new soy frontiers into the southern cone of Latin America – Argentina, Paraguay and
Brazil – where today collectively more than half of all soybeans are grown. Vast areas of forest
and cerrado (savannah) have been ploughed under, and helped by chemistry, genetics and agri-
cultural machinery, turned into exceedingly productive fields. In the meantime, soy consumption
has pivoted to China, which now accounts for almost two-thirds of the global soy trade. As else-
where, soy in China is used principally as livestock feed, powering an expansion in Chinese pork
production and underwriting a massive global increase in meat consumption.
Soy and sugar are just two examples of the many commodity frontiers that have moved across
the globe in the past six centuries. There are many more: coffee relocated from its ancient home on
the Arabian Peninsula to Java; from there to the Caribbean, then, in the nineteenth century, to
Brazil and Central and East Africa, where it is now considered a ‘traditional’ crop. Cotton, the fuel
of the Industrial Revolution, migrated from its ancient homes in South Asia, Africa and Central
America first into the Caribbean and Brazil, through a period of wild expansion in the USA, and
then, coming full circle, back to Egypt, western India, West Africa and Central Asia. When copper
started to feed the Second Industrial Revolution, its mining frontier travelled from Europe to
Chile, the Congo and Michigan. Palm oil moved from West Africa to Southeast Asia, tea from
China to India, wheat from its ancient homes in the Fertile Crescent into the vast steppes of
1Richard Ligon, A True and Exact History of the Island of Barbados (London: Peter Parker, 1673), 96.
2Ligon, A True and Exact History, 109.
3See United States Department of Agriculture, Foreign Agricultural Service, Circular Series, June 2020, World Agricultural
Production.
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eastern Europe to Argentina and the American Midwest and coal from Europe to North America,
Russia, China, India and Australia. Huge territories on all continents have seen their ecologies and
societies radically reconfigured by the incursion of new commodity frontiers, outside capital,
migrant workers and innovative technologies. Millions of people have laboured on these com-
modity frontiers, often under coercion, and huge wealth has streamed from fields and mines into
the coffers of capital-rich urbanites, while provisioning industrial workers with food, and
machines with supplies. In the process, native peoples have been dispossessed of land and rights,
and the countryside has been endlessly reconfigured into a source for global capitalist growth.
Crucially, commodity frontiers are variable in terms of place and commodity, and they change
over time. In 1700, for example, most cotton was grown by peasant producers on land they owned
or rented, then sold to merchant middlemen. In 1800, most cotton traded on global markets was
grown by enslaved cultivators on land taken from indigenous inhabitants; enslavement and pos-
session both funded by European metropolitan capital. Another 100 years later, in 1900, share-
croppers and tenant farmers drawing on European capital and enabled by massive state-directed
infrastructure projects and legal interventions produced cotton for global markets. There was also
significant diversity within given moments in time. In 1800, for instance, sugar was produced in
some regions of the world by enslaved workers, in others by peasant cultivators and elsewhere by
wage workers.
The concept of commodity frontiers is a powerful lens through which to analyse capitalism’s
history. It helps us understand on an empirical and conceptual level how ongoing incorporations
of new reservoirs of labour, land and nature have constituted capitalism’s extraordinary dynamics
– especially its ability to produce ever more goods. Focusing on the long history of these com-
modity frontiers allows us to analyse how frontier expansion has generated shifting sets of seem-
ingly localized activities to secure access to labour, land and nature for globalized commodity
production, helping us come to terms with the diversity of outcomes at any given moment
and their shift over time. Seeing how commodity frontiers have moved for centuries, taking
on very different characteristics – transitions marked by booms and busts, inherent ecological
and social limits including resistance, and altered by the very contradictions they produced –
let us better understand some of the fundamental dynamics of capitalism and its connection
to and subsumption of new spaces, new countrysides and new forms of nature. And, crucially,
looking at commodity frontiers makes it strikingly clear that it is impossible to fully understand
capitalism without thinking just as much about the countryside as about cities, about agriculture
as about industry.
Commodity frontiers are core constituents of the modern world. Understanding how and why
they have expanded, moved and adapted over time is thus a key step in a better understanding and
analysis of the global history of capitalism. But it includes great challenges: how to account for the
enormous variety and specificity of actors and places involved in this history, the dizzying number
of changes that have taken place as well as their almost unfathomable scale, without losing sight of
the broad movements of global capitalism and its systemic transformations? It is to this funda-
mental social sciences challenge that global history can contribute crucial insights.
Capitalism and commodity frontiers
Considering the spectacular rise in the growing of agricultural commodities and the mining of
minerals in the past centuries, and the stunning and ongoing social and environmental effects
of their production and circulation, it is not surprising that many scholars from a variety of dis-
ciplines have tried to grasp the underlying mechanisms of commodity frontier expansion.
Economists have contributed much to our understanding of these issues, especially their dis-
cussion of whether and to what extent capitalism can resolve the social and ecological crises it has
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created. We learn from Edward Barbier’s monumental Scarcity and Frontiers that over the past
centuries, some commodity frontiers sustained successful resource-based development, while
many more collapsed under social and ecological pressures.4 We also discover that capitalist pro-
duction has created and extracted a wealth of new agricultural commodities and minerals across
the world, while polluting bodies of water, land and people, depleting and salinizing soils and
degrading the very conditions of its own reproduction. Many economists conceptualize these pro-
cesses by emphasizing that capitalism tends to externalize social and ecological costs, and that the
best way to correct such imbalance is to internalize them. In both economic research and policy-
making, internalizing externalities has become a widely accepted approach to furthering global
sustainability. Neoclassical economists are especially optimistic about such ecological accounting.
Paul Collier, one of this field’s most prominent voices, promotes an analytical tool he calls ‘right
prices’ and highlights the role of ‘inclusive and transparent institutions’ in defining and regulating
such prices.5
Ecological economists, on the other hand, have looked at the same set of facts and come to very
different understandings. Economist Joan Martinez-Alier, along with human ecologists working
on distributional conflicts such as Alf Hornborg, for example, are sceptical that capitalist exter-
nalities can be priced into submission. They offer alternative conceptions of how to define capital-
ism’s ecological problems, seeing them as the political results of uneven distribution.6 They deploy
concepts such as social metabolism and unequal ecological exchange to analyse how the flows of
energy and materials between places and peoples generate and maintain inequalities. These schol-
ars contend that the capitalist system, rather than being able to self-correct by pricing externalities,
is based on crushing forms of ecological debt created by rich nations underwriting their growth
with the resources of poor nations. For these scholars, past centuries have been marked by indus-
trializing societies – almost always colonial powers – compensating for their ecological deficits by
imperialist exploitation.7 By opening new frontiers of commodity cultivation, production, extrac-
tion and waste disposal, these countries have exported problems of pollution, soil degradation,
poor labour conditions and social upheaval to poorer countries. Geographer David Harvey –
one of the most prominent voices in this debate – refers to this process as capital’s ‘spatial fix’
– the extraction of resources by dispossession and labour from local communities, resulting in
highly uneven development.8
Development studies scholars provide yet another set of approaches to understanding com-
modity frontiers by asking why many resource-rich countries tend to be characterized by low
levels of economic growth, massive economic inequality and high rates of poverty.
Neoclassical economic explanations for this ‘paradox of plenty’ or ‘resource curse’ tend to centre
on issues of incorrect pricing, misallocation of development revenues and inadequate institutional
4See United States Department of Agriculture, Foreign Agricultural Service, Circular Series, June 2020, World Agricultural
Production.
5See Paul Collier, The Plundered Planet. WhyWeMust – and HowWe Can –Manage Nature for Global Prosperity (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2010).
6Alf Hornborg, “Zero-Sum World. Challenges in Conceptualizing Environmental Load Displacement and Ecologically
Unequal Change in the World-System,” International Journal of Comparative Sociology 50, no. 3–4 (2009): 237–62.
7See Alf Hornborg, “Introduction: Environmental History as Political Ecology,” in Rethinking Environmental History.
World-System History and Global Environmental Change, ed. Alf Hornborg, J.R. McNeill, Joan Martinez-Alier (Lanham:
Altamira Press, 2007), 1–26.
8David Harvey, The Limits to Capital (Oxford: Blackwell, 1982); David Harvey, “The Geopolitics of Capitalism,” in Social
Relations and Spatial Structure, ed. Derek Gregory, John Urry (Basingstoke, Hampshire: Macmillan, 1994), 128–63; David
Harvey, Spaces of Capital: Towards a Critical Geography (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2001); Stephen H.
Bunker, “Natural Values and the Physical Inevitability of Uneven Development Under Capitalism,” in Rethinking
Environmental History. World-System History and Global Environmental Change, ed. Alf Hornborg, J.R. McNeill,
Joan Martinez-Alier (Lanham: Altamira Press, 2007), 239–258; Alf Hornborg, “Zero-Sum World”.
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quality and oversight.9 Critical economists and political ecologists, especially in Latin America,
argue, in contrast, that this outcome is not a paradox, but rather the direct result of outside actors
and institutions extracting minerals, raw materials and forest and agricultural resources and
exporting them along with the water, energy, labour and knowledge that they embody. To con-
ceptualize that impact of commodity frontier expansion, these thinkers use notions of extracti-
vism, neo-extractivism and post-extractivism.10 Other scholars, including Mattias Borg
Rasmussen, Christian Lund and Nancy Peluso, use the concept of territorialization to explain
how patterns of resource exploration, extraction and commodification have dissolved existing
social orders and reordered spaces. The reshaping of social and economic orders around new
resource frontiers profoundly reworks patterns of authority and institutional architectures such
as property systems, political jurisdictions, rights and social contracts.11
Insights from these debates are germane for studying the social and environmental foundations
and the effects of capitalism’s commodity frontiers in the global countryside. But even as various
disciplines converge around studying the social and environmental foundations and effects of cap-
italism’s commodity frontiers, their concepts remain siloed in discrete literatures. What is more,
many (though not all of them) tend to focus on contemporary problems, their analysis limited by a
failure to fully consider the many centuries of commodity frontier expansion.
The importance of history
Historical concepts are crucial, however, in situating present issues in longer trajectories to high-
light the patterns that will ultimately help us find new analytical tools to grapple with our present.
Of course, there is a long tradition of looking at capitalism historically, and indeed a distinguished
group of social scientists – from Werner Sombart and Fernand Braudel to Immanuel Wallerstein
and Alain Bihr – has argued that global capitalism emerged on the eve of the Columbian voyages
across the Atlantic, that capitalism, in fact, was born global.12 For this group of scholars and others
in that tradition, commodity frontier expansion was a key marker of capitalism from its very
beginning.
No one has done more to understand capitalism as a system encompassing distant places and
people than Terence Hopkins and Immanuel Wallerstein, the developers of the concept of the
commodity chain.13 Their aim was to show the emergence of a worldwide division of labour about
9On the “resource curse” see amongst others F. van der Ploeg and S. Poelhekke, “Natural Resources: Curse or Blessing?,”
Journal of Economic Literature 49, no. 2 (2011): 366–420; R.M. Auty, Resource Abundance and Economic Development
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).
10On extractivism see Eduardo Gudynas, “Transitions to Post-Extractivism: Directions, Options, Areas of Action,” in
Beyond Development, ed. Miriam Lang and Dunia Mokrani (Amsterdam: Transnational Institute, 2013), 165–88. On neo-
extractivism, see Hans-Jürgen Burchandt and Kristina Dietz, “(Neo-) Extractivism – A New Challenge for Development
Theory from Latin America,” ThirdWorld Quarterly 35, no. 3 (2014): 468–86. Extractivism has been extended beyondmineral
extraction to include agriculture and forestry. On post-extractivism and counternarratives, see J. Martinez-Alier, et al.,
“Between Activism and Science: Grassroots Concepts for Sustainability Coined by Environmental Justice Organizations,”
Journal of Political Ecology 21 (2014): 19–60.
11Mattias Borg Rasmussen and Christian Lund, “Reconfiguring Frontier Spaces: The Territorialization of Resource
Control,” World Development 101 (2018): 388–99; Nancy Lee Peluso and Christian Lund, “New Frontiers of Land
Control: Introduction,” Journal of Peasant Studies 38, no. 4 (2011): 667–81.
12Alain Bihr, Le premier âge du capitalisme (1415–1763): Vol. 1. (L’expansion européenne Lausanne: Page deux, 2006).
There are also those who disagree, seeing capitalism’s history instead as either much longer (for example, Larry Neal and
JeffreyWilliamson, The Cambridge History of Capitalism. 2 vols (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), or as emerg-
ing in a very particular locale in Europe and becoming global only in the nineteeth century, most prominently Robert Brenner.
13Terence Hopkins and Immanuel Wallerstein, “Commodity Chains in the World Economy Prior to 1800,” Review 10, no.
1 (1986): 157–70. See also Gary Gereffi and Miguel Korzeniewicz, eds. Commodity Chains and Global Capitalism (ABC-Clio,
1994); William G. Clarence-Smith and Steven Topik, eds. The Global Coffee Economy in Africa, Asia and Latin America: 1500–
1989 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Jennifer Bair, “Editors Introduction: The Political Economy of
Commodity Chains,” Journal of World-Systems Research 20, no. 1 (2014): 1–10 and see further this special issue.
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600 years ago, a system that typically connected rural commodity-producing regions in the
periphery with processing industries and consumers, typically in cities located in what they called
the ‘core.’ These production processes, they argued, were ‘cross-cutting political jurisdictions,’
expanding over time, and subject to structural transformations.14 Because the commodity chain
concept sees commodities as ‘containers of hidden social relations’, it concentrates on people
working on commodity frontiers, the places where they work, the conditions they work under
and the social relations governing their work and production.15
Feminist scholars working in this tradition, importantly, have expanded the scope of the com-
modity chain to include the unwaged household work that produces labourers and the ‘free gifts of
nature’ that contribute to the making of commodities and commodity frontiers.16 They have
endeavoured, asWilma Dunaway put it, to make visible those ‘transfers of value that are embodied
in commodities but do not show up in prices’.17
In recent years, global historians have picked up on some of these ideas. Studies on the history
of particular commodities, for example, have persuasively illustrated the deep links between agri-
culture and industry, the countryside and the city and the household and production. These stud-
ies have revealed how the global emerged from local configurations and have shown the essential
role played by the politics, ideas and collective actions of non-elite actors such as rural cultivators,
especially in the Global South, in shaping commodity frontiers, and thus the political economy of
global capitalism.18 Similarly, many scholars have been sensitive to the ecological dimension of
economic and technological divergence between ‘core’ and ‘periphery’. Environmental historian
and historical geographer Jason W. Moore, for example, has argued that since for most of human
history technological advances were slow and piecemeal, the global economy derived much of its
growth from an unstinting expansion of vast frontiers of labour, food, energy and raw materials.19
Sidney Mintz made the point abundantly clear in his Sweetness and Power, observing how slave
labour produced cheap sugar for the emerging British industrial proletariat. Slave-based sugar and
cotton supplied calories and clothing that industrialising Britain could never have procured from
its own soil. In the words of historian Kenneth Pomeranz, these processes provided Britain with
ecological relief.20
It is at this point that Jason W. Moore’s argument that global capitalism is organized through
frontiers becomes especially relevant. For him, these frontiers have expanded from one place to
the next, transforming socioecological relations as they go, producing more and more goods and
services that circulate through an expanding series of exchanges. Valued by a growing number of
scholars from different disciplines as a problem-oriented transdisciplinary approach to historical
processes, Moore’s commodity frontier concept invites a radical rethinking of the commodity
14Hopkins and Wallerstein, “Commodity Chains,” 158.
15Jane Collins, “A Feminist Approach to Overcoming the Closed Boxes of the Commodity Chain,” in Gendered Commodity
Chains: Seeing Women’s Work and Households in Global Production, ed. Wilma A. Dunaway (Stanford: Stanford University
Press, 2014), 27; Jane Collins, Threads: Gender, Labor, and Power in the Global Apparel Industry (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 2003).
16Nancy Fraser, “Behind Marx’s Hidden Abode,” New Left Review 86 (March/April 2014).
17Wilma A. Dunaway, “Women’s Labor and Nature: The 21st Century World-System from a Radical Ecofeminist
Perspective,” in Emerging Issues in the 21st Century World-System, ed. Wilma Dunaway (Praeger Press, 2003), 189. Joan
Smith and Immanuel Wallerstein eds. Creating and Transforming Households. The Constraints of the World-Economy
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).
18Sven Beckert, Empire of Cotton: A Global History (New York: Alfred A. Kopf, 2014); Ulbe Bosma, The Making of a
Periphery: How Island Southeast Asia Became a Mass Exporter of Labor (New York: Columbia University Press, 2019).
19Jason W. Moore, Capitalism in the Web of Life: Ecology and the Accumulation of Capital (London: Verso, 2015); Alf
Hornborg, J.R. McNeill, and Joan Martinez-Alier, Rethinking Environmental History. World-System History and Global
Environmental Change (Lanham: Altamira Press, 2007).
20Sidney W. Mintz, Sweetness and Power: The Place of Sugar in Modern History (New York: Viking, 1985); Kenneth
Pomeranz, The Great Divergence. China, Europe and the Making of the Modern World Economy (Princeton and Oxford:
Princeton University Press, 2000), 274–8.
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chain approach from which it emerged. Commodity chain analysis starts from what its advocates
have called ‘the core’ and works downstream towards peripheral locations of subaltern produc-
tion, crop cultivation, mineral extraction and so on. The commodity frontier approach, in con-
trast, begins with the countryside – a significant departure. It moves analytically from chains of
(labour) relations to frontiers of spatial expansion that include not only labour, but the incorpo-
ration and extraction of non-human nature.
Yet capitalism never changed solely by expanding in space and scale. It also experienced fun-
damental shifts in character, including in the dominant patterns of commodity frontier expansion.
Analysing and understanding how these patterns varied across time and place, how and why such
variations were institutionalized and how and why key dynamics changed requires a reflection on
the periodization of capitalism. An influential approach here is that of Harriet Friedmann and
Philip McMichael’s work on successive food regimes. Concerned with ‘the role of agriculture
in the development of the capitalist world economy, and in the trajectory of the state system’,
their food regime concept has been debated, critiqued and carried further in the past 30 years.21
Recently, Friedmann has amended a rather rigid structural conceptualization of food regimes by
bringing agency and social movements more centrally into the frame. For her, a regime is consti-
tuted by a ‘relatively stable set of relationships’ with ‘unstable periods in between shaped by polit-
ical contests over a new way forward’.22 Meanwhile, McMichael specified that the food regime is
foremost an analytical device and historical method to pose specific questions about the structur-
ing processes of the global political economy, and/or global food relations, at any particular
moment.23 Food regimes as a concept have thus developed into a device for periodization and
a proposal for a comparative historical method that links broad political-economic change to local
agency and contestation.
Commodity regimes
All the approaches outlined above illuminate important aspects of the expansion of commodity
frontiers during the past six centuries. Yet, each is limited in its own way. Much of the writing on
the history of capitalism produced during the past 150 years privileges a perspective from the city,
from industry and from labour outside the household; not surprisingly, considering that most of
these authors were men who resided in cities located in industrializing countries. Yet, the vast
majority of humanity has lived and worked, until very recently, in rural and domestic places,
and it was in these places that many of the revolutions of capitalism have taken place. And while
commodity histories and commodity chain analysis have persuasively shown the deep links
between agriculture and industry and the countryside and the city, their focus on single commod-
ities has limited their ability to capture the expansion of commodity frontiers across several cen-
turies and around the world as a whole. Global historians have captured some of these general
processes, but their all-too-frequent privileging of top-down perspectives and elite actors has
led them to ignore how the global, including global commodity frontiers, has emerged from local
configurations of social space and social power. Scholars who focus squarely on commodity fron-
tiers have often concentrated on single factors to illuminate their dynamics, insisting, for example,
on master explanations like the ‘spatial fix’ (Harvey and Moore) or the ‘technical fix’ (neoclassical
21Philip McMichael, “Global Development and the Corporate Food Regime,” in New Directions in the Sociology of Global
Development, ed. Frederick H. Buttel, and Philip D. McMichael (Bingley: Emerald Group Publishing Limited, 2005), 272;
Harriet Friedmann and Philip McMichael, “Agriculture and the State System: The Rise and Fall of National Agricultures,
1870 to the Present,” Sociologia Ruralis, 29, no. 2 (1989): 93–117; Philip McMichael, “Commentary: Food regime for thought,”
Journal of Peasant Studies, 43, no. 3 (2016): 648–70.
22Harriet Friedmann, “From Colonialism to Green Capitalism: Social Movements and the Emergence of Food Regimes,” in
New Directions in the Sociology of Global Development, ed. Frederick H. Buttel and Philip D. McMichael (Bingley: Emerald
Group Publishing Limited, 2005), 227–64, and here 228.
23Philip McMichael, “A Food Regime Genealogy,” Journal of Peasant Studies 36, no. 1 (2009): 148.
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economists) and failing to historicize particular responses to particular moments of commodity
frontier expansion.24 Last but not least, many discussions of contemporary commodity frontier
dynamics (i.e. land grabbing, flex crops, extractivism) fall into the trap of emphasizing the newness
of developments that go back many centuries and can only be understood via a historical
perspective.
What we need, instead, is to analyse commodity frontiers through a historical approach that (1)
keeps multiple frontiers in the view over a very long time period, (2) focuses on a variety of actors,
including capitalists, rural cultivators (peasants and slaves, men and women, indigenous people
and state bureaucrats), (3) takes both a global and a local view to scrutinize frictions, contestations
and counter movements from the household to the international arena and (4) asks how com-
modity frontiers have transformed in fundamental ways over the past 600 years, producing new
kinds of dynamics, encountering particular resistances and constructing new fixes.
The concept of commodity regimes allows us to identify moments in the history of commodity
frontiers in which particular sets of labour relations and property rights, patterns of land owner-
ship, forms of the insertion of capital, state policies and technologies come to define a given his-
torical period. It is a meta-historical device that allows us to capture the ways in which different
societal domains on commodity frontiers (ecological, technological, social and political) are orga-
nized and relate to one another; it allows us to periodize and subdivide as needed, while still
understanding the unity of the diverse.
Over time, we see that commodity frontiers exhibited regular, albeit shifting, combinations of
labour systems, property regimes, technologies and state interventions. Any systematic analysis of
the long history of these frontiers needs to begin by acknowledging this diversity. But we also need
to acknowledge certain patterns. Properly analysed, these patterns help us understand the chang-
ing character of commodity frontiers as a constituent in the historical development of capitalism.
We can distinguish, roughly speaking, four distinct commodity regimes during the past cen-
turies of capitalism’s history, with the transitions from one to the next propelled by key trans-
formations such as the abolition of slavery, the Industrial Revolution, the emergence of
powerful state bureaucracies both in the industrializing countries of the North Atlantic and
the colonial peripheries, and over the course of the twentieth century, the massive concentration
of corporate enterprises.
The first such regime, which lasted from the 1450s through the 1850s, can be termed an early
capitalist commodity regime. It was characterized by direct and violent dispossession of people
from land and nature and by unfree labour systems that included chattel slavery, peonage and
indentured contract labour.25 Its forceful expansion was sanctioned by states, but its principal
expansionary driver was merchant capital. The sugar commodity frontier is exemplary for this
particular regime. Sugar production principally expanded because ever more land was violently
taken out from underneath its native inhabitants, ever more workers were enslaved, and ever more
capital moved from Europe into distant locations. Merchant capitalists and planters exerted a
decisive influence on this commodity frontier, often ruling faraway places and organizing the
day-to-day domination of labour. By the end of this period, maroonage and rebellion emerged
as central social contestations, while technological advances propelled new and deeper forms
of exploitation of both labour and nature.
24The idea that there are additional fixes besides the well-known spatial fix has been expressed by Beverly Silver in her book
Forces of Labor: Worker’s Movements and Globalization Since 1870. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 76. She
mentions among others the technological/organizational fix. See also Giovanni Arrighi, “Spatial and Other “Fixes” of
Historical Capitalism,” [https://irows.ucr.edu/conferences/globgis/papers/Arrighi.htm], 2003 and Marcel van der Linden,
Workers of the World: Essays Toward a Global Labor History (Leiden: Brill, 2008).
25An extensive investigation of these changing labour relations is conducted by the Global Collaboratory on the History of
Labour Relations, based at the International Institute of Social History in Amsterdam: https://collab.iisg.nl/web/
labourrelations. See also Karin Hofmeester and Marcel Van der Linden eds. Handbook Global History of Work (Berlin,
etc.: De Gruyter, 2018).
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The second regime, from the 1850s to the 1970s, can be described as an industrial commodity
regime. It was characterized by the massively expanding use of fossil energy, soaring industrial and
state demand for commodities and the rise of multinational capital, global bulk commodity mar-
kets and new transport and communication technologies. These factors reinforced infrastructural
capabilities ranging from the telegraph to railroads, shaping the conditions under which commod-
ity frontiers expanded, including the contractual mobilization of land and labour.
While the forms this transformation took were complex and varied across time and space, four
central features can be distinguished: the conversion of a system of customary land rights into
legally defined titles to land ownership; the transformation of the concept of property from ambig-
uously defined areas to concretely defined, possibly enclosed, physical spaces; the rationalization
of the use of such demarcated landed property as a form of capital and the increased privatization
of the earth’s surface through dispossession and displacement of peasants and indigenous pop-
ulations. Sharecropping, tenant farming, indentured servitude and wage labour increasingly
replaced non-economic labour coercion such as enslavement. Massive colonial projects fuelled
the commodification of land, while land grabs abolished communal peasants’ rights and devel-
opmental projects or state-sponsored collectivization schemes led to further expropriation and
displacement. Agricultural science, in turn, brought productivity leaps, eventually leading to
the Green Revolution of the 1960s. Like the previous commodity regime, the industrial commod-
ity regime was always contested, with labour activism and anti-colonial movements joining older
forms of resistance.
The industrial commodity regime had enormous staying power and was propelled to new
heights by the rapid economic expansion in the three decades after the Second World War.
However, by the 1970s, it started to unravel and be replaced by a new corporate commodity regime.
Slow economic growth hit numerous commodity-producing countries particularly hard, reducing
their governments’ abilities to mitigate market volatility and forcing them to accept structural
adjustment programmes. This reinforced the changing role of the state vis-à-vis transnational cor-
porations and financial institutions, as well as new global political divisions amongst and between
North and South, simultaneously reproducing and remapping imperial, colonial and Cold War
political geographies. The concentration of power in the hands of a few producers took a quantum
leap as commodity trade and financial institutions became tightly connected from the 1980s on.
Capitalist agriculture created new commodified inputs (seeds, fertilizers, pesticides, etc.) and legal
protections for corporate ownership, resulting in further power concentrations at commodity
frontiers. A massive contraction of land rights accelerated the growth of a rural proletariat on
a world scale, and resistance movements acquired a transnational character.26
Cracks in the corporate commodity regime became visible with the Great Recession and the
world food crisis in 2008, spurring a fourth – still tentative – contemporary commodity regime. In
this emerging regime, key elements of the previous regimes are reintegrated and intensified. For
instance, firms already entrenched at the top of commodity markets and financial actors looking
for new investment opportunities have come to own or finance increasing amounts of land around
the world, largely through dispossession, often with the assistance of state power, best expressed in
the newly fashionable public-private partnerships (PPPs). Green capitalism, built on the co-
optation of sustainability discourse, continues to create new products and frontiers for accumu-
lation, amongst them organic foods, biofuels and the optimistically named clean coal.27 Rising
authoritarianism around the world is pressuring people and environments on commodity
26See Joe Bandy and Jackie Smith, eds. Coalitions Across Borders: Transnational Protest and the Neoliberal Order (Lanham
Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005); Saturnino M. Borras Jr., Marc Edelman, and Cristóbal Kay, Transnational Agrarian
Movements Confronting Globalization (New York: Wiley-Blackwell, 2008).
27See Scott Prudham, “Pimping Climate Change: Richard Branson, Global Warming, and the Performance of Green
Capitalism,” Environment and Planning A 41 (2009): 1594–613; Victor Wallis “Beyond ‘Green Capitalism’,” Monthly
Review 61, no. 9 (2010): 32–48; Friedmann, “From Colonialism to Green Capitalism”.
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frontiers in South America, the USA, South East Asia and elsewhere. At the same time, new
dynamics are coming into view in this post-2008 era that Klaus Schwab, Executive Chair of
the World Economic Forum, has called the ‘fourth industrial revolution’.28 Companies (often with
state assistance) are expanding into radically new production and information technologies,
including new automated (robot) labour in manufacturing, households and agriculture.
Relatedly, new digital infrastructures that extract data and mediate between different groups have
become increasingly important for commodity frontiers. Examples of what Nick Srnicek calls plat-
form capitalism include agricultural implements manufacturer John Deere’s data collection sys-
tems that record farmers’ activities and commodify the data and mobile phone-based money
transfer and (micro)financing services such as Vodafone’s M-Pesa that operate in East Africa
and elsewhere, and China’s new ‘Study the Great Nation’ social platform that collects user data
for surveillance and advertising.29 As this regime is still unfolding, questions about which pro-
cesses and relations will be most important, which will spur or encounter the most resistance,
and what forms that resistance will take remain.
These four regimes have engendered widely divergent forms of expansion and exploitation,
showing capitalism to be highly adaptive and flexible. And like capitalism more broadly, each
regime contains profound tensions, generating fierce contestation. Approaching the history of
capitalism through commodity regimes speaks against a teleological or linear interpretation of
the relationship between capitalism and the countryside, as Figure 1 clearly shows, and aids us
in uncovering capitalism’s shifting historical and spatial logic. Figure 1 is our effort to describe
in a tentative way and at the most general level how we propose to investigate frontier expansion
as a series of cumulative frictions and fixes.
Commodity regimes and their frictions
The expansion of commodity frontiers was not a smooth unfolding of one universal logic or of
unstinting human progress, but a series of regimes that transformed themselves in quite funda-
mental ways at certain moments. These transformations occurred because each regime ran into
frictions that eventually made the further expansion of commodity frontiers impossible without
fundamental changes. Preliminary investigations suggest that these regimes succeed each other at
an accelerating pace, going from 400 years for the first regime to 30 years for the third. Market
convergence and the increased momentum of technological change as well as growing resistance
might account for fundamental frictions occurring more frequently. But these are assumptions
that we want to test. In doing so, our point of departure is that commodity regimes encounter
frictions along three central axes: (1) ecological frictions, (2) competition for land and labour
(3) and social resistance, including counternarratives that contest the existing commodity regime.
To begin with, ecological frictions have imposed an important set of limitations on commodity
frontier expansion. In the early phases of capitalism, ecological frictions such as declining soil
fertility forced the production of agricultural commodities or minerals to move into new areas.
Later, crippling diseases that swept through populations of uniformly bred crops and livestock
instigated the quest for disease-resistant plant varieties, broad-spectrum pesticides and fungicides,
more powerful vaccines and tightly controlled production systems with labour-disciplining bio-
security measures. Ecological damage caused by commodity agriculture or extraction rendered
many frontiers unproductive or uninhabitable, often causing the end of the production of this
particular commodity at this location. Deserted mining regions around the globe, the problem
of severe water shortages and salinization surrounding the irrigated cotton fields in Central
Asia, the wheat frontier in the USA and its degeneration into the infamous Dust Bowl in the
1930s are all examples of collapsed commodity frontier zones caused by ecological frictions.
28https://www.weforum.org/about/the-fourth-industrial-revolution-by-klaus-schwab.
29Nick Srnicek, Platform Capitalism (Cambridge, UK; Malden, MA: Policy, 2016).
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Likewise, frictions arising from competition for land and labour have destabilized many com-
modity frontier zones. Rebellions of enslaved and servile women and men were a permanent fea-
ture of the frontier zones during the early capitalist commodity regime. Slavery became
increasingly untenable due to resistance by enslaved people such as the revolution in Saint-
Domingue in 1791 and the large-scale uprising in Jamaica in 1832, as well as the emergence
of an abolitionist movement. Labour shortages were a perennial problem for commodity frontiers;
in fact, during the many centuries in which mechanization proceeded slowly, labour supplies were
the main limiting factor for commodity production. Once slavery was abolished and tropical com-
modity agriculture left its plantation enclaves, it increasingly inserted itself into existing rural soci-
eties, where it had to compete for land and labour. Thus the expansion of global capitalism
increasingly encroached upon existing land rights, often using large-scale destruction of commu-
nal land ownership and outright dispossession and displacement of peasants and indigenous pop-
ulations. This massive accumulation through dispossession has been a source of permanent, often
violent, conflict.
Across the four regimes, commodity regime expansion produced other social frictions as well.
As merchants, chartered companies, colonial officials, mining capitalists and frontier planters,
amongst others, expanded into new territories and new productive activities, appropriated new
land, extracted new materials and incorporated new labour, their ongoing attempts to externalize
the social and environmental costs of production and reproduction were met with resistance.
Coupled with ecological limits, such resistances can prefigure and compel regime change, pushing
capital to seek new frontiers. During the early capitalist regime, for instance, revolt and desertion
(maroonage) were responses to enslavement and servitude and helped propel the shift to share-
cropping and wage labour. During the industrial regime, strikes, working-class political
Figure 1. Commodity regimes, frictions and fixes.
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mobilizations and unionization, together with anti-colonial movements, joined rebellion and
escape as forms of insurgency. Later, as corporate-headed transnational commodity chains inte-
grated global production in the corporate regime, resistance has also become transnational.
Workers struggled against capital’s ‘race to the bottom’, indigenous communities against the pol-
luting and degrading activities of transnational corporations that often operate with near impu-
nity, peasants against the incursions of transnational capital into agrarian spaces. In some cases,
resistance also provided counternarratives and counterproposals for different ways of organizing
political, economic, social and ecological life – in recent years, for example, by seeking collabora-
tive, locally embedded, equitable or non-growth-based forms of production. Because counter
movements suggest some of the key themes around which people are exploited or oppressed,
studying resistance within regimes is a crucial part of defining and analysing the regimes them-
selves – and helping to explain how over time they changed fundamentally.
Commodity regimes and their fixes
Frictions and resistances were part of each commodity regime over the centuries, usually culmi-
nating in systemic crises. In response, new commodity regimes emerged, characterized by partic-
ular fixes or combinations of fixes. Each ensemble was particular to particular moments in the
history of global capitalism. The fixes, as described in Figure 1, were (A) the spatial fix, (B)
the technological fix, (C) the state-led fix and (D) the corporate fix. Although each new fix
was hailed as the master key to resolving the then-current limits to commodity frontier expansion,
they were usually not entirely new. Moreover, older fixes did not disappear. Spatial fixes, for exam-
ple, remain powerful today, usually at the expense of tropical rain forests, grasslands, indigenous
communities and biodiversity.
Nonetheless, the spatial fix was most pronounced during the early capitalist commodity fron-
tier regime, when the state was distant and quite weak and most increases in output came from
additional inputs of land and labour. Until the late eighteenth century, the consequences of soil
exhaustion caused by sugar, tobacco or coffee plantations, for example, were almost always over-
come either by using additional labour to perform manuring or by adding more land for crop
rotation. Labour shortages were addressed by immigration of either free or enslaved workers,
as happened in most of the plantations of the New World. From the late eighteenth and particu-
larly the early nineteenth century onward, a new set of fixes emerged to join the continuing spatial
expansion. In the early stages of capitalism, technology had only a limited impact on productivity.
The Industrial Revolution changed this, as it resulted in massive mechanization of both agriculture
and mining and immense improvements in transportation, although these innovations entered
the commodity frontiers unevenly and increased rural inequalities through class differentiation
and lay the ground for future ecological distribution conflicts.
Increasingly, the state came to play a more prominent role in commodity frontier expansion.
Where the expansion of commodity frontiers had previously been driven by a particularly violent
type of capitalism exerted by merchant capital and sanctioned by the state, in the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries states attained the infrastructural capability needed to shape the conditions
under which frontiers operated. Infrastructure construction, financial legislation, sponsored
migration of contract labour and legislation and implementation of new property rights regimes
all featured as prominent new forms of state interventions. While technology-enabled global com-
modity production to soar after the systemic crisis that attended the abolition of the slave trade
and slavery itself, these technological innovations would not have materialized without the new
role played by the state.
Science, moreover, produced leaps in agricultural productivity, including the Green Revolution
at the end of the industrial commodity regime. Differential access to technology and the ways
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that capitalist agriculture created new commodified inputs (seeds, fertilizers, pesticides, etc.)
engendered new dependencies for farmers,30 thus leading to further concentrations of power
at the commodity frontier. The current stage of biotechnology enables the integration of the food
and energy sectors and a profound appropriation of life through seed patents and intellectual
property protections, leading to further large-scale dispossessions. In fact, over time, the state-
led fix has paved the way for a transnational corporate enterprise to become the dominant force
on commodity frontiers, which continues – not without contestation – in the contemporary
regime.
Capitalism has been driving the creation of increasingly integrated and complex commodity
chains, massively changing the relationship between commodity frontiers and processing indus-
tries. Significant convergence of commodity prices appeared by the late eighteenth century; infor-
mation systems connected the global countryside with industrial centres by the mid-nineteenth
century; the concentration of power in the hands of a few end producers intensified during the
twentieth century, especially in the 1980s when commodity trade and financial institutions
became tightly connected. Currently, a narrow range of mostly transnational corporations con-
trols much of the expansion of commodity frontiers through direct ownership of land and means
of production and contracting, subcontracting, digital data collection and general control of com-
modity circulation.31 Much of the economic risks and the environmental and social costs of
corporate-led production are dumped on marginalized people and places, while new calls for sus-
tainability are co-opted into opportunities to deepen Green Capitalism in the new commodity
regime.
The framework of commodity regimes takes commodity frontiers as an analytical point of
departure, sensitizing us to geopolitical shifts, the role of the state, technology, ecology, and last
but not least, local agency. This is to say that capitalism develops not only through incorporation
and commodification, but also through what resists it. Non-human nature is not flat, constant or
given: soils give out, water becomes scarce or toxic, wells run dry, ‘weeds’ and microorganisms
develop resistance to agrochemicals and antibiotics. At the same time, social movements and civil
society initiatives compel capital to adjust to the demands of organized groups of people, some-
times creating new avenues and segmented markets for capital such as fair trade and organic label-
ling in food, and sometimes creating a barrier for capital to overcome, such as wage labour.
A research strategy
It is challenging to translate the framework of commodity regimes into a workable research strat-
egy; this challenge, of course, also pertains to global history’s project of making wide-ranging com-
parisons across large time spans and geographic regions.32 A commodity frontiers research project
30See David Goodman, Bernardo Sorj, and John Wilkinson, From Farming to Biotechnology: A Theory of Agro-Industrial
Development (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987). The authors describe this process as appropriationism, whereby ‘elements once
integral to the agricultural production process are extracted and transformed into industrial activities and then reincorporated
into agriculture as inputs’ (p. 2). Through state policies and agribusiness-led markets, farmers adopt these technologies, enter-
ing into production treadmills that create dependencies, competitive imperatives in price-governed markets, and systemic
ecological degradation. See also Philip Howard, “Visualizing Consolidation in the Global Seed Industry: 1996–2008,”
Sustainability 1, no. 4 (2009): 1266–87.
31See McMichael, “A Food Regime Genealogy”; Jennifer Clapp and Doris Fuchs, eds. Corporate Power in Global Agrifood
Governance (Cambridge Mass.: MIT Press, 2009).
32We refer to some useful reflections: Philip McMichael, “Incorporating Comparison within a World-Historical
Perspective: An Alternative Comparative Method,” American Sociological Review, 55, no. 3 (1990): 385–97; Gareth
Austin, “Reciprocal Comparison and African History: Tackling Conceptual Eurocentrism in the Study of Africa’s
Economic Past,” African Studies Review 50, no. 3 (2007): 1–28; P. Parthasarathi, “Comparison in Global History,” in
Writing the History of the Global. Challenges for the 21st Century, ed. M. Berg (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2013),
69–82.
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directly engages with ongoing debates about the ambitions, promises and limits of global and
world history. It requires building collaborative and discipline-crossing research networks. It
offers methods and sources for a history that aims to surpass or delegitimize the old
Eurocentric stories of the rise of a unified world.33
We aim for an inductive approach that studies localized experiences and global systemic move-
ments and past experiences and contemporary problems within a single analytical framework.
This requires that we overcome the fragmented and individualized character of archival research
and fieldwork, which, because they are so labour intensive, usually produce geographically and
temporally limited work. The immense library of existing case studies does not add up to a sys-
tematized body of knowledge. Another challenge – one that again pertains to global history more
broadly – is to move beyond privileging the national level as a unit of analysis. Many historical
indicators of development – per capita income, demography, migration, balance of trade, etc. – are
only available at the national level, but commodity frontier zones are usually subnational units,
and sometimes cross national borders.34 National data collections remain indispensable, but data
collection at the subnational and transregional level is equally important.
While still difficult, an inductive and multi-scalar approach is increasingly feasible thanks to
innovative technologies of data gathering, analysis and visualization. Digital humanities techni-
ques let us look at a myriad of sources to illuminate the workings of commodity frontiers at the
local level and may release us from over-relying on data aggregated at the national level.
Publications on particular commodity frontier zones that span decades and perspectives are
already available in digital format, and we can draw on their research findings. Moreover, since
frontier zones are marked by the commodification of land and labour, they have been relatively
well documented by colonial administrations, revenue records and so on. In recent years archives
have been digitizing their holdings of documents, historical artefacts and newspapers.
Archaeologists working on the Baltics, Southern Spain and the Eastern Mediterranean, for exam-
ple, have employed excavations, paleoenvironmental sources and laser techniques that would help
us reconstruct even the oldest commodity frontiers.35
If these sources can be digitally connected and automated data-mining processes applied to
them, it becomes feasible to extract a wide range of data from very disparate sources in different
languages. What is more, semantic technology can help us create structured data sets from
immense collections of fuzzy data. Analysis of these sources within a global comparative context,
enhanced by visual representations such as maps and graphs, can provide clues for new hypothe-
ses to be tested against the assembled corpus of data or even Linked Open Data. These technolo-
gies facilitate the integration of geographic knowledge from diverse data sources, and they have
33Richard Drayton and David Motadel, “Discussion: The futures of global history,” Journal of Global History, 13, no. 1
(2018): 1–21; Eric Vanhaute, “Who Is Afraid of Global History? Ambitions, Pitfalls and Limits of Learning Global
History,” Osterreichische Zeitschrift Fur Geschichtswissenschaften 20, no. 2 (2009): 22–39; Patrick O’Brien,
“Historiographical Traditions and Modern Imperatives for the Restoration of Global History,” Journal of Global History,
1, no. 1 (2006): 3–39, 38; Dominic Sachsenmaier, “World History as Ecumenical History,” Journal of World History, 18,
no. 4 (2007): 465–89; Barbara Weinstein, “History Without a Cause? Grand Narratives, World History, and The
Postcolonial Dilemma,” International Review of Social History, 50, no. 1 (2005): 71–93, 80; Kenneth Pomeranz, “Writing
About Divergences in Global History. Some Implications for Scale, Methods, Aims, and Categories,” Writing the History
of the Global. Challenges for the 21st Century, ed. M. Berg (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2013), 117–28.
34See, for example, the Maddison Conference Board: https://www.conference-board.org/data/economydatabase/index.cfm?
id=27722 and https://www.clio-infra.eu/.
35Aleksander Pluskowski, Adrian J. Boas, and Christopher Gerrard, “The Ecology of Crusading: Investigating the
Environmental Impact of Holy War and Colonisation at the Frontiers of medieval Europe,” Medieval Archaeology 55
(2011): 192–225. See also the Medin project (Mediterranean Insularities: Space, Landscape and Agriculture in Early
Modern Cyprus and Crete. https://medins.ims.forth.gr/,
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been developing rapidly, offering the promise that they will soon become more customer-
friendly.36
To deliver on the promises of a commodity frontiers centred analysis of global capitalism we
need to draw on approaches and disciplines that often stay aloof from one another.37 Combining
data gathering and analysis techniques with fieldwork will bridge the divide between disciplines
that study the past and those that study the present. Global historians need to draw on the meth-
ods of ecological economists and other social scientists – on the Environmental Justice Atlas
https://ejatlas.org/, for example – to map today’s ecological inequalities. Combining archival
research, fieldwork and digital techniques and deploying an inductive methodology at different
spatial and time scales will enable us to understand the shifts of key commodity frontiers and the
emergence of particular commodity regimes, and thus to redraw our understanding of global
capitalism.
***
Studying the global history of commodity frontiers is crucial to coming to terms with important
aspects of world history over the past six centuries. But this project is just as important when it
comes to understanding our contemporary dilemmas. Two recent reports commissioned by the
European Union recommend that the EU considers its giant global ecological footprint.38 These
reports – along with international reporting more generally – suggest that we have arrived at a new
state of unsustainability. But as alarming as this is, when we look at commodity frontiers over the
very long term, we immediately see that our contemporary dilemmas are not new. The consump-
tion of massive amounts of extra-European resources is an old story that goes back at least 600
years and has played a major role in Europe’s economic ascendancy. There is a similar, though
shorter story for the USA and other emerging powers that arrange their economies through a mix
of domestic production and global trade in commodities that usually originate in the countryside.
To disentangle the complexities that may derail today’s attempts to frame a global agenda of
sustainable growth, we have to understand in new historical depth the dynamics of appropriation
of nature, enclosures of land, regimes of labour control and transfers of capital and knowledge and
the concomitant elimination of ecological and social knowledge. At the same time, global history
can deliver on some of its fundamental promises by looking systematically at global change over
very long time periods while remaining attentive to history told from the bottom-up. A new global
social history will allow us to analyse consecutive commodity regimes and understand the ways
they have created unequal power relations and massive inequities that shape the present. Studying
commodity frontiers can help us identify historical capitalism as a process rooted in a profound
restructuring of rural societies and their relation to nature and lets us connect processes of extrac-
tion and exchange with degradation, adaptation and resistance in rural peripheries. When we look
at the history of the sixteenth-century sugar frontier or the mid-twentieth-century soy frontier as
moments in the unfolding of various commodity regimes over the past six centuries, we gain not
just novel perspectives on the history of capitalism, but also on our contemporary dilemmas.
Global historians can make a unique contribution to this conversation.
36See, for example, the work by Reinaldo Funes of Cuba’s Fundación Nuñez Jimenez who has been leading the way in
developing a historical GIS for Cuba, focused on mapping changing land use and ownership, the spread of the
commodity-plantation economy and its environmental impact. http://www.fanj.org.
37For an extensive discussion of transdisciplinarity, see Eve Darian-Smith and Philip McCarty, “Beyond Interdisciplinarity.
Developing a Global Transdisciplinary Framework,” Transcience 2 (2016): 1–26, and Id., The Global Turn. Theories, Research
Designs, and Methods for Global Studies (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2017).
38Feasibility study on options to step up EU action against deforestation (January 2018); Study on the environmental impact
of palm oil consumption and on existing sustainability standards (February 2018).
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